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mac_partition.4freebsd

Langue: en

Version: 300286 (debian - 07/07/09)

Section: 4 (Pilotes et protocoles réseau)


BSD mandoc

NAME

mac_partition - process partition policy

SYNOPSIS

To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:
options MAC options MAC_PARTITION

Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

options MAC

and in loader.conf5:

 mac_partition_load="YES"
 

DESCRIPTION

The policy module implements a process partition policy, which allows administrators to place running processes into ``partitions'' based on their numeric process partition (specified in the process's MAC label). Processes with a specified partition can only see processes that are in the same partition. If no partition is specified for a process, it can see all other processes in the system (subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page). No provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions are available.

Label Format

Partition labels take on the following format:
partition / value

Where value can be any integer value or ``none '' For example:

 partition/1
 partition/20
 partition/none
 

SEE ALSO

mac(4), mac_biba4, mac_bsdextended4, mac_ifoff4, mac_lomac4, mac_mls4, mac_none4, mac_portacl4, mac_seeotheruids4, mac_test4, maclabel(7), mac(9)

HISTORY

The policy module first appeared in Fx 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

This software was contributed to the Fx Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS'' ) as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in Fx .

While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

L'Homme n'est pétri d'un limon plus précieux ; la Nature n'a employé
qu'une seule et même pâte, dont elle a seulement varié les levains.
-+- Julien La Mettrie -+-